Operating leverage and the cost of debt in European agri-food firms by Grau, Alfredo & Reig, Araceli
Operating leverage and the cost of debt in European agri-food firms 
Alfredo Grau (Grau, A), and Araceli Reig (Reig, A)
Universitat de València, Facultat d'Economia. Avda. de los Naranjos s/n. 46022 Valencia, Spain
Abstract
Aim of study: To analyse the effect that operating leverage exerts on the cost of debt of agri-food firms in Europe, both in isolation and 
indirectly through its other risk factors. 
Area of study: We used panel data made up of 18,360 European firms from 2009 to 2016 (146,880 observations). 
Material and methods: The data were extracted from the ORBIS database and EUROSTAT. The econometric approach was estimated 
by the Generalized Method of Moments.
Main results: The results obtained confirm that operating leverage or cost structure, in addition to affecting the cost of debt, also affects 
the relationship between that cost and other sources of risk. More specifically, indebtedness, size, specificity and age all affect the cost of 
debt to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the level of operating leverage of the company.
Research highlights: The main contribution was the study of the cost of external financing as a function of the cost structure, because 
this directly influences the competitiveness of companies in a key sector of the European economy. We also demonstrated the country 
effect, taking into account the different policies and practices regarding the assumption of risk by firms. The agri-food sector has been 
subject to special aid programs of research & development distributed unevenly across countries. If we add to this the national subsidy 
programs, the level of indebtedness is not a clear determinant of the cost of debt. The main determinant of that cost is the operating 
leverage. 
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Introduction
The risk assumed by the creditors of a firm depends on 
the internal characteristics of the firm, the sector of activi-
ty and the legal and economic environment of the country 
in which it operates. The firm characteristics that affect 
risk are determined by decisions about the financial struc-
ture and the asset structure. Decisions about the financial 
structure generate financial risk and decisions about as-
sets generate operational risk. There is abundant literature 
that studies the effect of financial risk on the cost of debt 
and the profitability of the firm. However, the effect of 
operational risk and operating leverage has received little 
attention. Moreover, most of the research carried out to 
date on the effect of operating leverage on the risk and 
profitability of the firm has focused on firms listed on fi-
nancial markets and has studied the effect on the betas 
and the expected returns of the firm's shares (Lev, 1974; 
Mandelker & Rhee, 1984; Zahng, 2005; García-Feijóo & 
Jorgensen, 2010; Houmes et al., 2012; Cao, 2015; No-
vy-Marx, 2011).
This industry is characterised by being very competi-
tive, with many small and young companies competing 
against larger and more mature firms. Other authors have 
also analysed the effect of operating leverage on this in-
dustry, but have focused on the profitability of Small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Grau & Reig, 2020). 
Given the importance of this industry in the European 
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economy and the major drive towards innovation by its 
companies and governments, we consider it worthwhile 
to analyse whether the sector (including large compa-
nies and SMEs) has an adequate operating cost struc-
ture, or if, on the contrary, it generates too much ope-
rational risk, leading to higher financial costs, which in 
turn would negatively affect the sector's competitiveness 
in the global market.
The operational risk depends on the type of assets used 
by the firm in its production process, since these deter-
mine the cost structure or the operating leverage. Nume-
rous papers use the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as 
a proxy for cost structure and operating leverage, arguing 
that high levels of fixed assets generate high fixed costs 
(O´Brien & Vanderheiden, 1987; Houmes et al., 2012; 
Harjoto, 2017).
Operational risk also depends on the characteristics 
of the sector of activity, such as the concentration of the 
sector or the elasticity of demand. Therefore, if compa-
nies from different industries are analysed, operating le-
verage could not be used as the only variable indicating 
operational risk. However, if all companies belong to the 
same sector and share the same risk characteristics of the 
sector, operating leverage will be a good indicator of ope-
rational risk. Novy-Marx (2011) showed that the effect of 
operating leverage on the risk of the company is deter-
minant within an industry, while no clear relationship is 
found when analysing it between industries. In short, we 
can affirm that within an industry, those companies that 
operate with a greater weight of fixed costs over variable 
costs will be riskier.
We directed our study towards only one sector, the 
agri-food industry, made up of companies dedicated to 
the second link in the agri-food value chain, that is, ma-
nufacturing firms involved in the transformation of raw 
materials into semi-processed or processed products. In 
addition, the importance of this sector can be seen from 
the reports provided by the AgFunder platform1  (https://
agfunder.com), which show that the agri-food industry 
attracts many private and institutional investors (venture 
capital). Given the innovation and the technological deve-
lopment that is transforming and modernising the sector, 
the emerging needs of the population are being addressed 
(AgFunder, 2014).
Finally, it is worth highlighting the consideration of the 
country effect, in which we first carried out the study for 
a sample of European companies, and then separate the 
countries with different practices and with different legal 
and economic environments with respect to the assump-
tion of risks. To do this, we choose the countries with the 
1  It is a Venture Capital platform for Agri-Food Technologies that helps accredited and institutional investors to invest in the development of technologies that will transform the 
food and agricultural industries.
2  Afonso (2003) showed that economic development and GDP per capita are the most relevant factors in determining country risk. 
highest average gross domestic product (GDP) in Europe 
in the period considered and with the greatest weight in 
the European agri-food industry2.
Our goal is to analyse the importance of operational 
risk in determining the cost of debt in European agri-
food firms, first in isolation and then indirectly through 
other risk factors such as indebtedness, size, specifici-
ty or age of the company. Regarding the relationship 
between operating leverage and the cost of debt, the 
results of the few investigations carried out show that 
it is positive, that is, the higher the operating levera-
ge, the greater the cost that firms bear when financing 
themselves with external resources. An important fac-
tor that will determine whether this relationship is sig-
nificant or not is the firm’s institutional and legal en-
vironment. Greater protection of the investor will lead 
to more discipline on the part of the managers of the 
firm. Cleassens et al. (2000) demonstrate empirically 
that the legal, economic and institutional characteristics 
of a country affect the risk that firms are willing to as-
sume and, therefore, the cost of debt. In countries whe-
re laws protect shareholders and investors to a greater 
extent (common law jurisdictions), firms assume lower 
risks, both financial and operational. These authors 
consider that the effect will be different depending on 
the sector and the type of assets and products, but, in 
general, they go so far as to conclude that the greater 
the protection of investor rights, the lower the level of 
optimal leverage.
La Porta et al. (1997) argued that countries with a 
“common law” origin are more efficient in the develop-
ment of contracts and offer greater protection to external 
investors, both shareholders and creditors. These coun-
tries react more quickly to new situations and transmit 
much less uncertainty regarding the outcome of the reso-
lution of a legal dispute. Other studies that examine the 
relationship between the legal environment and risk are 
those made by Simintzi et al. (2014) and Serfling (2016), 
who observed that rigid labour laws will lead to greater 
operational risk, decreasing the optimum level of indeb-
tedness in order to offset one type of risk with another. 
Legislation is also important in terms of transparency 
and the requirement for the disclosure of information by 
firms. Francis et al. (2005) showed that firms that need 
more external financing must maintain more transparent 
accounts, which reduces asymmetric information and 
leads to cheaper financing.
Cleassens et al. (2000) also pointed to the question 
of whether the financial system is based on banking or 
on the markets as being determinative in the relationship 
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between risk and the cost of debt. These authors showed 
that in banking-oriented countries, firms assume greater 
risk as they are less controlled by the markets. Allard 
& Blavy (2011) concluded that economies based on fi-
nancial markets recover faster from recessions than ban-
king-oriented ones, so there is less risk involved when 
investing in firms in these countries. Depending on the 
development of the financial markets and the weight of 
the bank debt in the total debt of firms, countries are 
classified into one of two systems (Demerguc-Kunt & 
Levine, 1999; Allard & Blavy, 2011). 
In this paper we carried out separate analyses for 
different European countries, since mixing together 
firms that operate in different legal and institutional en-
vironments can distort the results. In effect, the country 
will be decisive in terms of the impact that operating 
leverage has on the cost of debt in an isolated way, and 
also indirectly through other risk factors such as indeb-
tedness, size, specificity and age. These four factors 
affect risk, since financial risk is greater if the level of 
indebtedness is higher, the creditor has less information 
when the firm is small and young, and the creditor has 
fewer guarantees if the specificity is greater. We consi-
der these four risk variables to be crucial in an industry 
characterised by high levels of innovation and major in-
vestment in research & development (R&D) being made 
by a large number of small and young companies. 
Regarding the relationship between debt level and 
operating leverage, it is expected that, in general terms, 
the most indebted firms will be those with the lowest 
operating leverage in order to offset the two types of 
risk: financial and operational. According to Kahl et al. 
(2014), firms with high levels of fixed operating costs 
are more conservative in their capital structure strategy, 
maintaining more liquidity and lower levels of indebted-
ness. However, firms use debt to increase fixed assets, 
which leads to higher fixed costs, such that greater indeb-
tedness can be accompanied by greater operational risk 
(Harjoto, 2017).
Most of the studies that compare operating and finan-
cial leverage with the risk of firms do so with listed firms 
and take the beta as an indicator of systematic risk. Hou-
mes et al. (2012) note a positive relationship between 
operating leverage and the beta of firms in the transport 
sector, reaching the conclusion that operating leverage is 
more important in the definition of systematic risk than 
financial risk. In fact, the level of indebtedness does not 
turn out to be significant to explain the beta.
Based on the foregoing, we considered that, in gene-
ral, the level of indebtedness increases the cost of debt, 
but to a lesser extent if the firm assumes greater opera-
tional risk.
3  Other works published in prestigious journals that use this approach are Fee et al. (2006) and Kale & Shahrur (2007).
Hypothesis 1: The higher the operating leverage, the 
lower the positive relationship between the level of in-
debtedness and the cost of debt of agri-food firms.
In terms of size, there is evidence that it affects the cost 
of debt (Harjoto, 2017). Francis et al. (2005) observed a 
negative relationship between the two variables. When 
the size increases, the risk, and therefore the cost of debt, 
decreases (Sengupta, 1998; Houmes et al., 2012; Ylhäi-
nen, 2017).
Indeed, smaller firms support higher debt costs becau-
se they have less bargaining power and more information 
asymmetry, but that relationship can be diminished if they 
have low operating leverage. In the same way, the greater 
the size, the greater the bargaining power, the greater the 
prestige and the less the asymmetric information, all of 
which will allow firms to finance themselves at a lower 
cost. That ratio will be lower if the operating leverage is 
higher, as the risk is greater.
Therefore, among large companies, those with greater 
operational risk will have a higher cost of debt. In short, 
we consider that, the larger the size, the lower the cost of 
debt, but the negative effect is diluted with the highest 
operating leverage.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the operating leverage, the 
lower the negative relationship between size and the 
cost of debt of agri-food firms.
Third, we consider the specificity of the firm’s assets. 
The weight of intangible assets, such as advertising or 
R&D, in fixed assets is an indicator of the degree of in-
novation and specificity of the company. Intangible assets 
include investments in R&D, industrial property, compu-
ter applications and goodwill. Other intangibles that do 
not appear in intangible assets are human, customer and 
organisation capital, and know-how. This type of invest-
ment is not easily observable or measurable for a large 
sample size of companies. To overcome this limitation, 
as noted by Dass et al. (2014), the empirical literature ge-
nerally uses investment in intangible assets as a proxy for 
investment in specific assets and innovation3. Van Bins-
bergen et al. (2010) noted that the cost of debt is lower 
in firms with greater weight of tangible assets because, 
having more collateral, the creditor assumes less risk. 
On the other hand, Hyytinen & Pajarinen (2007) found 
no relationship between specificity and cost of debt when 
carrying out the study with Scottish firms. They concluded 
that as they are governed by the “common law”, they are 
less prone to take risks, and if they have a greater weight 
of intangible assets, that makes them riskier, which they 
will compensate for by having less debt.
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According to AgFunder (2016), given that it is the key 
to future growth, the need for technological innovation 
in this sector is now greater than ever. This reports for 
Agri-Food Technology indicate that the volume of finan-
cing granted through the Venture Capital Market platform 
between 2009 and 2013 remained constant at moderate 
levels. Starting in 2014, there was a turning point and it 
began to grow significantly (AgFunder, 2014), placing 
it well above other sectors of the economy, according to 
MatterMark (2014).
It can be seen that, by 2015, the figures were almost 
double those of the previous year, but at the end of the 
year the global investment in Agri-Food Technology went 
down. This contraction is explained by the fact that a lot 
of financing was obtained through venture-backed compa-
nies with the consequent risk of exposure to IPOs (Initial 
Public Offerings) (KPMG, 2015). From 2016 onwards, 
and in the face of political uncertainty, the venture capital 
market has fallen further, with funding for these compa-
nies dropping by 30%, although remaining above 2014 le-
vels (KPMG, 2016). The forecasts point to a bright future 
for venture-backed companies given the growing interest 
of private and institutional investors in supporting the fu-
ture of food and agriculture.
The agri-food industry is constantly innovating. As 
the agri-food sector has a major share of the European 
economy and is tremendously innovative, companies 
that innovate and invest in intangible assets usually re-
ceive some subsidy at the European and/or domes-
tic level, which reduces the cost of financing (Grau & 
Reig, 2020).
Therefore, although in general terms it is expected that 
specificity increases the risk and the cost, this effect can 
be cancelled out or reversed depending on the institutio-
nal and legal environment of the country. Greater protec-
tions for the investor will lead to more discipline on the 
part of the managers of the company, lowering the level 
of optimal leverage, such that some risks will be offset 
against others. On the other hand, in countries that allo-
cate greater subsidies to innovative companies, increased 
investment in R&D may be accompanied by cheaper fi-
nancing.
Furthermore, greater innovation can generate higher 
operating leverage, since it involves investment in 
fixed assets. In this way, the cross effect is expected 
to decrease the direct effect between specificity and 
cost. In general terms, we state the third hypothesis in 
the following way:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the operating leverage, the 
weaker the relationship between the degree of specifi-
city of the assets and the cost of debt of agri-food firms.
4  See the complete report at: https://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/publication/fooddrinkeurope-annual-report-2016
Finally, we introduced age as another risk factor. 
More mature firms have a lower average cost of debt, 
which some authors explain as being due to their less 
asymmetric information (Berger et al., 2001; Hernán-
dez-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010). In contrast, 
young firms have less negotiating power and the level of 
ignorance about them on the part of creditors is higher, 
which can cause greater difficulty in obtaining good 
financing conditions.
Indeed, age has been used in several corporate finance 
studies as an approximation of asymmetric information 
(Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Ylhäinen, 2017). These 
studies concluded that the older the firm is, the lower its 
cost of debt. However, we consider that age will have a 
greater or lesser effect depending on the operating leve-
rage that the firm is supporting, since mature firms with 
high leverage can see this negative age/cost of debt effect 
reduced due to the greater risk they take on.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the operating leverage, the 
lower the negative relationship between age and the 
cost of debt of agri-food firms.
The objective of this work was to analyse the effect 
that operating leverage has on the cost of debt of agri-
food industry firms and on other risk factors that normally 
determine this cost, such as size, financial leverage, spe-
cificity and age. These four factors affect risk, since finan-
cial risk is greater if the level of indebtedness is higher, 
the creditor has less information when the firm is small 
and young, and the creditor has fewer guarantees if the 
specificity is greater. One of the novelties of this work is 
the consideration of the cross-effects between operating 
leverage and other risk indicator variables. 
Material and methods
The agri-food industry: Sample and variables
Sample
The agri-food sector is one of the most important sec-
tors of the European economy according to FoodDrinkEu-
rope4 (www.fooddrinkeurope.eu). For the year 2016, the 
sales volume of the European food industry represented 
15.6% of the food and drink turnover in manufacturing. In 
addition, the EU continued to lead the world as the largest 
exporter of food and beverages. Furthermore, innovation 
and technological development in the sector is becoming 
very significant, and it has to face major financial challen-
ges that are not seen in other sectors (AgFunder, 2015).
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The sample was made up of firms from the agri-food 
sector (European Classification of Economic Activities, 
NACE Rev. 2: codes5 10 and 11) of European countries 
that were active during the 2009-2016 period. The coun-
tries with the highest average GDP in the analysed period 
were selected, that is, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, Swe-
den and the UK.6  In Table 1 (Panel A), the evolution of 
the GDP of these countries is presented.
The differences in macroeconomic conditions in the 
euro-zone countries become apparent when they are 
analysed in depth (Fig. 1). By analysing their financial 
structure through the level of debt7 over GDP of Euro-
pean companies, these differences between countries can 
be seen. Indeed, the highest level on average is attributa-
ble to Sweden (192.38) and the most moderate to Poland 
(74.76). The evolution of these levels also shows a hete-
rogeneous behaviour among these countries, although wi-
thin each country a fairly stable growth is observed throu-
ghout the period (Grau & Reig, 2015).8 In particular, in 
France and Poland the level of debt has been increasing, 
with the particularity that Poland is starting from very low 
levels of debt. On the other hand, Spain and the UK are 
making an effort to deleverage. On average, the debt le-
vel in the whole sample has fallen over the course of the 
analysed period.
The data used in this study have been obtained from 
several sources. First, the economic-financial data for 
5  Manufacture of food products and manufacture of beverages, respectively. These are the companies in the second link of the value chain that transform raw materials into pro-
cessed and semi-processed products.
6  Germany has been excluded, given that, during the study period, most of the German firms were not required to present annual accounts. 
7  This information is produced regularly by the European Commission and published through EUROSTAT.
8  These authors point out that the less indebted, non-vertically integrated agri-food companies have not seen their profitability decrease in times of crisis.
each country have been extracted from the ORBIS data-
base of Bureau van Dijk. Secondly, the GDP series for 
each country has been obtained from EUROSTAT.
Furthermore, the series of variables used have been 
filtered to eliminate, firstly, the observations with errors 
in the financial statements, and secondly, the extreme ob-
servations that exceeded 95% or those that were below 
5% in all the distributions. This double filtering process, 
depending on the country, has meant the loss of approxi-
mately between 12.8% and 19.3% of the original sample. 
Finally, the panel data consists of 18,360 European firms 
with a total of 146,880 observations.
Cost of debt vs. operating leverage in agri-food 
European firms
The cost of debt is the variable that we intend to exp-
lain (dependent), and since it is not directly observable, 
we had to estimate it. In the same way that various earlier 
works such as Francis et al. (2005), Hyytinen & Pajarinen 
(2007) and Ylhäinen (2017) have done so, we estimate 
the cost of debt by dividing the interest paid for the debt 
incurred by the average of the debt with the cost at the 
beginning and at the end of the period.
In Table 1 (Panel B), we provided the evolution of 
the cost of debt of the different countries considered 
Table 1. Panel A: GDP growth (base year 2010; Source EUROSTAT). Panel B: Cost of debt by country
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A
France 98.1 100 102.1 102.3 102.9 103.8 104.9 106.2
Italy 98.3 100 100.6 97.7 96.1 96.2 97.1 97.9
Poland 96.5 100 105 106.7 108.2 111.7 116 119.4
Spain 100 100 99 96.1 94.5 95.8 99.1 102.3
Sweden 94.3 100 102.7 102.4 103.6 106.3 111.1 114.7
UK 98.3 100 101.5 103 105.1 108.3 110.8 113
Panel B
EUROPE 0.0240 0.0206 0.0221 0.0225 0.0211 0.0204 0.0183 0.0164 0.0207 0.0024
France 0.0209 0.0191 0.0201 0.0174 0.0160 0.0151 0.0139 0.0133 0.0170 0.0029
Italy 0.0221 0.0184 0.0204 0.0222 0.0218 0.0215 0.0207 0.0186 0.0206 0.0015
Poland 0.0300 0.0245 0.0243 0.0300 0.0232 0.0239 0.0163 0.0095 0.0227 0.0068
Spain 0.0263 0.0220 0.0233 0.0239 0.0225 0.0216 0.0185 0.0164 0.0218 0.0031
Sweden 0.0345 0.0347 0.0400 0.0426 0.0366 0.0322 0.0291 0.0256 0.0344 0.0055
UK 0.0242 0.0235 0.0225 0.0240 0.0205 0.0215 0.0174 0.0154 0.0211 0.0032
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throughout the analysis period. These table indicates that 
the pattern of behaviour of the cost of debt has not been 
homogeneous among the different countries of Europe. 
The recent crisis has had effects on these very different 
economies, and each country has adopted its own econo-
mic and monetary policies to mitigate these effects. On 
the other hand, many firms have embraced the EU's rural 
development policies9 that grant subsidies to those that 
process and market agricultural products, and which aim 
to improve the competitiveness of agri-food sector. It is 
notable that among the countries under study, the coun-
try that receives the least European subsidies is Sweden, 
which could explain, at least in part, the higher costs that 
Swedish companies have borne.
In addition to these subsidies at the European level, 
agri-food firms have received other subsidies linked to 
the country where they carry out their activity. This could 
have caused a lessening, in average terms, of the cost of 
debt of the firms from countries with high subsidies. It is 
worth mentioning the existence of the OSEO10 platform 
in France, which is a public company with no equivalent 
in the rest of Europe, whose mission is to finance innova-
9  See the complete report European Court of Auditors, Special Report No1, 2013, at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013SA0001&from=ES
10  See the report on the financing of innovation in France at: https://es.ambafrance.org/
tion and the growth of companies. In 2009 alone, OSEO 
made more than 100,000 interventions that allowed in-
novative SMEs to obtain some 25 million euros of fi-
nancing. In addition, among the sectors that receive the 
most aid and subsidies is the agri-food sector, which is 
mostly made up of SMEs. French agri-food companies 
have borne the lowest cost of debt (Table 1, Panel B) 
and, as we will see in the next section, they are the ones 
that have made the largest investment in R&D over the 
study period. 
For all this, the cost of external financing that Euro-
pean agri-food firms have shouldered has behaved in 
an uneven manner in the different countries conside-
red. These differences are what lead us to study the de-
terminants of the cost of debt separately, i.e. country 
by country.
Explanatory variables
In Table 2 we provide the set of variables that we have 
used in our study and in Table 3 their descriptive statistics. 
Figure 1. Private sector debt (% of GDP). Source: EUROSTAT
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The main variable that we considered to explain the cost 
of external financing is operating leverage, since it is one 
of the main sources of risk borne by the creditors of com-
panies and has had little attention in the literature. To me-
asure it, we used the relationship between net fixed assets 
and total assets (OLM).
Measuring the operating leverage of a firm is not easy 
because operating accounts do not distinguish between 
the different costs that the activity of the firm generates 
and, therefore, data on fixed and variable costs are not 
available. Numerous authoritative works have used the 
relationship between net fixed assets and total assets as 
a proxy for the cost structure and the operating levera-
ge, arguing that high levels of fixed assets generate high 
fixed costs (O'Brien & Vanderheiden, 1987; Houmes et 
al., 2012; Cao, 2015; Harjoto, 2017).
The other measure most used in the financial literature 
is the degree of operating leverage (DOL), which is calcu-
lated by dividing the variation in Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes (EBIT) by the variation in sales11 (Houmes et 
al., 2012; Harjoto, 2017). Houmes et al. (2012) studied 
the impact of operating leverage on systematic risk in lis-
ted firms with the two measures mentioned. They compa-
red the results obtained by using the degree of operating 
leverage with those obtained by using the ratio between 
net fixed assets and total assets. They concluded that the 
weight of net fixed assets over total assets determines the 
beta of the assets more significantly.
11  Kahl et al. (2014) criticized this measure as an indicator of risk because managers can influence depreciation, which can be manipulated and which depends on past investments, 
and thus does not represent current costs.
The other main variables are found in Table 2. We use 
the variable LEV as an indicator of financial leverage, and 
the logarithm of the total assets as an indicator of size, 
LTOTASS. We used the variable INTANG as a measure 
of the specificity of the assets and the innovation, since 
a greater proportion of investment in intangible assets 
means more investment in R&D and in more specific as-
sets. The justification for the use of INTANG as a mea-
sure of innovation and specificity has been developed in 
the section on the theoretical framework. Next, we used 
AGE as the number of years that firms have been carrying 
out their activity. Finally, we considered the economic 
growth of each country through the variable GPDGRW, 
which shows the variation that its GDP experiences each 
year. This variable, in addition to making it possible to 
know the importance of the economic situation, can also 
be used as an indicator of the country effect, since the 
order of countries based on this macroeconomic data did 
not vary throughout the period considered (see Table 1, 
 Panel A).
Finally, we introduced control variables that have 
shown a high degree of explanatory power for the cost 
of debt: interest coverage (INTCOV), liquidity (LIQUID) 
and cash flow (CASH).
The use of these explanatory variables in the regres-
sion process could cause problems of multicollinearity 
given the high degree of interrelation that can be establi-
shed between them. To detect these problems and to take 
Table 2. Description of the explanatory variables
Parameters Description
Dependent variable
COD Cost of debt: Interest expenset / average of the beginning and end total debtt
Main explanatory variables
OLM Operating Leverage Measure: Net Fixed Assets / Assets.
LEV Leverage: (Net Liabilities + Fixed Liabilities) / (Total Liabilities + Equity).
LTOTASS Total Assets: Logarithm of the Assets.
INTANG Intangible: Intangible Assets / Assets.
AGE Age: Number of active years.
GDPGRW GDP Growth: (GDPt – GDP2010) / GDP2010.
Control variables
INTCOV Interest Coverage: EBIT / Interest expense.
LIQUID Liquidity: (Current Assets- Stocks) / Current Liabilities.
CASH Flow Available: Cash Flow / Operating Income.
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Table 3. Statistical descriptive for variables
COD OLM LEV TOTASS INTANG AGE GDPGRW INTCOV LIQUID CASH
  EUROPE (N=18360)
Mean 0.02066 0.42497 0.60216 19,987.71 0.05318 23.50006 0.00019 210.6346 1.32630 5.57824
Std. Dev. 0.02917 0.24096 0.29708 424,207.4 0.14316 16.97458 0.02338 7,873.23 2.21052 10.0479
Jarque-Bera 2.57E+10** 5.84E+03** 3.38E+06** 1.16E+11** 1.38E+06** 4.34E+05** 5.93E+03** 2.02E+12** 1.65E+08** 2.52E+06**
VIF (mean: 1.1425) --- 1.1886 1.2545 1.1881 1.1617 1.1799 1.0128 1.0025 1.1957 1.0992
COD OLM LEV TOTASS INTANG AGE INTCOV LIQUID CASH
  France (N=4244)
Mean 0.01696 0.44133 0.57477 28,532.46 0.16150 25.06456 117.1385 1.18555 6.14339
Std. Dev. 0.02712 0.24646 0.25941 655,192.4 0.24301 18.616 1,915.256 1.28073 6.12276
Jarque-Bera 1.19E+11** 1.89E+03** 4.37E+05** 7.11E+09** 1.13E+04** 4.51E+04** 1.64E+10** 1.66E+07** 1.11E+05**
VIF (mean: 1.4690) --- 2.2355 1.324 1.264 2.194 1.217 1.0044 1.344 1.1693
  Italy (N=5691)
Mean 0.02074 0.37043 0.61017 9,390.646 0.03376 24.91047 221.2604 1.20676 5.70227
Std. Dev. 0.03459 0.23146 0.24044 72,727.86 0.07588 17.38196 4,067.937 1.74017 10.3127
Jarque-Bera 5.55E+08** 2.00E+03** 5.51E+02** 2.12E+10** 1.66E+06** 2.40E+04** 4.57E+10** 9.30E+07** 7.48E+05**
VIF (mean: 1.1760) --- 1.1792 1.4125 1.1421 1.0728 1.1572 1.0092 1.322 1.1131
  Poland (N=428)
Mean 0.02269 0.51961 0.51941 17,672.18 0.00870 23.9602 58.8288 0.93825 6.16884
Std. Dev. 0.06290 0.19079 0.20464 51,800 0.03945 24.0563 351.000 0.79984 5.90301
Jarque-Bera 7.26E+06** 4.64E+01** 2.44E+01** 1.26E+06** 1.25E+06** 3.15E+04** 6.21E+06** 1.11E+05** 2.76E+03**
VIF (mean: 1.3294) --- 1.3778 1.7909 1.2124 1.0663 1.0633 1.063 1.7143 1.3476
  Spain (N=7100)
Mean 0.02181 0.45320 0.61711 6,513.755 0.00854 20.43638 290.9819 1.56145 5.06966
Std. Dev. 0.02037 0.24158 0.36014 49,391.71 0.04208 12.34017 12,205.26 3.03079 12.0182
Jarque-Bera 1.26E+06** 1.99E+03** 1.42E+06** 1.38E+10** 5.38E+07** 2.85E+05** 1.59E+11** 2.24E+07** 5.68E+05**
VIF (mean: 1.1244) --- 1.0742 1.2685 1.1984 1.0192 1.1692 1.0021 1.1645 1.0991
  Sweden (N=470)
Mean 0.03439 0.44990 0.63705 17,094.92 0.01100 24.12979 10.31303 1.13278 5.05398
Std. Dev. 0.02901 0.23374 0.27571 95,761.78 0.07169 19.63037 46.96227 0.98720 9.24506
Jarque-Bera 2.50E+05** 9.40E+01** 1.16E+04** 2.40E+06** 1.41E+06** 1.17E+04** 1.50E+06** 8.44E+04** 4.85E+04**
VIF (mean: 1.2712) --- 1.2000 1.4833 1.4097 1.0213 1.2855 1.0987 1.5024 1.1691
    United Kingdom (N=427)
Mean 0.02112 0.42025 0.57537 295,081.7 0.03311 36.49297 99.18306 1.19824 6.34362
Std. Dev. 0.02895 0.21788 0.29260 1,767,904 0.09179 30.08333 650.1150 0.97801 6.81544
Jarque-Bera 2.27E+06** 1.05E+02** 3.12E+04** 4.86E+06** 5.83E+04** 2.91E+03** 4.71E+07** 6.04E+04** 7.99E+04**
VIF (mean: 1.2915) --- 1.3187 1.4283 1.3724 1.2011 1.2646 1.0257 1.4406 1.2808
This table presents the typical descriptive statistics for the variables defined in panel data of 2009-2016, the Jarque-Bera test for con-
trasting normality, and the variance inflation factor (VIF) to diagnose the presence/absence of multicollinearity. **p<0.01, *p<0.05, 
^p<0.1.
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the appropriate measures, we applied the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF).
Empirical analysis
Taking the empirical evidence consulted as a referen-
ce, we analysed the determinants of the cost of debt of 
European agri-food firms by means of static panel data. 
This allowed us to control for the existence of unobserva-
ble heterogeneity that is greater with cross-sectional data 
(Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002).
We modelled the cost of debt (COD) for the European 
countries considered through the following theoretical 
model:
jt π πjt jt
π=1
COD = φ+ γ · + ε                  (1)
where X  is a vector of the π explanatory variables π  
are the unknown estimated parameters, and jt the random 
perturbation.
We present our econometric approach for the theo-
retical model described in Eq. (1), which integrates the 
specific explanatory variables, the cross-effects of these 
with the operating leverage and the control variables. The 
estimation and contrast of this model adopts the following 
structure:
jt 0 1 jt 2 jt 3 jt 4 jt
5 jt 6 jt 7 jt 8 jt
9 jt 10 jt jt 11 jt
12 jt 13
COD = δ +δ OLM +δ LEV +δ LTOTASS +δ INTANG
                  +δ AGE +δ GDPGRW +(δ LEV +δ LTOTASS
                  +δ INTANG +δ AGE )*OLM +δ INTCOV
                   +δ LIQUID δ CASH jt j t jtη +λ ε+ +
 
(2)
where CODjt represents the cost of debt for firm j (j=1, …, 
J) in time period t (t=1, ..., T), calculated as the quotient 
between the interest paid for the incurred debt and the ave-
rage of the debt with the cost at the beginning and the end 
of the period in which the interest has accumulated; δ0  
represents the intercept (constant term) of the regression; 
j represents the estimated values of the cross-section re-
gression coefficients with the following breakdown: the 
main variables  j=OLM, LEV, LTOTASS, INTANG, 
AGE and GDPGRW; the variables crossed with OLM: 
 j=(LEV*OLM), (LTOTASS*OLM), (INTANG*OLM) 
and (AGE*OLM); and the control variables  j=INTCOV, 
LIQUID and CASH. j is the unobservable heterogeneity 
that arises from the existence of a series of unobservable 
individual effects. It attempts to encapsulate the speci-
fic unique qualities of each company, which may inclu-
de the characteristics of its sector, although there may 
12  This procedure was developed by Arellano & Bond (1991) and presents two levels of application depending on the nature of the random disturbance. If the residuals are homoce-
dastic, the GMM estimate in one stage would be the most appropriate. If, on the other hand, there is heterocedasticity, the estimator of the instrumental variables in one stage will 
remain consistent, but the estimation in two stages increases the efficiency..
be variance among them, but it is assumed that they are 
constant (the attributes of managers: management capa-
city, personal skills, etc.); and the specific effects of the 
industry (entry barriers or market conditions). The main 
drawback comes from the impossibility of approxima-
ting them to some measure, as they are unobservable. 
t  are temporary dummy variables that change over 
time but are the same for all the companies in each of 
the periods considered. In this way, the aim is to captu-
re the economic variables (interest rates, prices, etc.) 
that cannot be controlled by companies, but which can 
affect their financial decisions. Finally, jt are the random 
perturbations.
Regarding the coefficient of each crossed variable, if it 
is of the same sign as that of the main variable, the effect 
of said variable on the cost of debt is increased the greater 
the operating leverage. On the other hand, if the coeffi-
cient of the crossed variable is opposite to that of the main 
variable, the effect of that variable is reduced as the ope-
rating leverage increases.
To deepen our study, we proposed some econometric 
variants, so we estimated and contrasted three models. In 
this way we studied the effect of operating leverage on 
cost, both in isolation, and indirectly through the other 
risk factors proposed. These models were regressed firstly 
for panel data that integrates all the countries in the sam-
ple (Europe), and then regressed individually for each of 
the countries considered (France, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK).
Thus, Model 1 only included the control variables 
(INTCOV, LIQUID and CASH) and OLM, which allows 
us to know their explanatory capacity. Model 2 includes 
all the main variables (OLM, LEV, LTOTASS, INTANG, 
AGE and GDPGRW) along with the control variables. 
We intended to ascertain the explanatory increase that 
these risk indicator variables have over our key variable 
OLM. Finally, Model 3 is the most complete model sin-
ce it encompasses all the variables enunciated in Eq. (2), 
that is, the control variables, the main variables (except 
OLM) and the cross-effect variables (LEV*OLM, LTO-
TASS*OLM, INTANG*OLM and AGE*OLM). This 
last model allows us to analyse whether the effect that 
the main risk variables have on cost of debt depends on 
whether the firm has high or low operating leverage. In 
this way, we will learn the degree of compliance with the 
hypotheses previously raised.
The parameters have been estimated, incorporating 
instrumental variables by the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM)12 to the equation in first differences. 
This methodology controls unobservable heterogenei-
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ty and also prevents possible endogeneity problems 
(through the use of instrumental variables) that could ari-
se, since the random perturbations that affect the decisions 
on the levels of profitability can also affect other charac-
teristics of the companies (Baños-Caballero et al., 2012, 
2013; Martínez-Sola et al., 2013). However, although 
this procedure by definition could correct these problems, 
there are reasons why some variables could be subject 
to endogeneity.
A robust study was carried out to detect the presen-
ce of endogeneity by way of the Hausman test (1978), 
which corrects the model by taking the first differences 
and comparing the estimation coefficients by instru-
mental variables and by OLS (under the null hypothe-
sis of the existence of exogeneity in the explanatory 
variables). The Hausman (1978) tests of the different 
estimations show there are no endogeneity problems 
and that the within–group estimator was consistent 
(Table 4).
As measures of the goodness of fit, we proposed the 
adjusted R2, the Wald test set of coefficients equal to each 
other and equal to zero (under the null hypothesis that 
 1 =  2 = ... =  6 = 0), the estimation error calculated from 
the sum of the mean of the square of the errors (errors 
due to the bias of the estimator) plus the variance, and 
the significance of the total set of the mean of the error 
equal to zero on the residuals (under the null hypothesis 
that E( )=0). Additionally, to test the consistency of the 
estimates, the second-order serial correlation absence 
test (m2 test) also proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991) 
was used. In turn, we used the test of Sargan (1958) 
on the over-identification of restrictions (under the null 
hypothesis that the instruments used are valid) to verify 
the absence of correlation between the instruments and 
the error term.
Results 
Once the data and the variables were analysed, we 
observed that Wald's contrast justified the joint explana-
tory power of the parameters, and the contrast of mean 
equal to zero allows us to accept the hypothesis of un-
biasedness of the errors (see the lower part of Tables 4 and 
5). On the other hand, the results of the m2 test indicate 
the absence of second-order serial correlation since the 
instruments used in the GMM estimates are not correla-
ted with the error term, both for the complete European 
sample and for the countries separately. Furthermore, 
the Sargan test cannot be rejected and, consequently, 
the instruments incorporated in the GMM regression 
are valid.
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of the 
three models for the complete European sample, and in 
Table 5 for each country separately. The results from all 
the analyses carried out showed us that a positive rela-
tionship exists between operating leverage and the cost of 
debt (Models 1 and 2). Therefore, the cost structure, mea-
sured with OLM, was shown to be a significant source of 
risk and is a fundamental determinant of the cost of debt 
in all countries, indicating that the higher the operating 
leverage, the higher the financing cost borne by European 
agri-food companies.
GDP growth (GDPGRW) was statistically significant 
with a negative sign in the three models (Table 4), which 
shows that if the country is growing, the cost of debt de-
creases. This variable, in addition to making it possible to 
know the importance of the economic situation, can also 
be used as an indicator of the country effect, since the 
order of countries based on this macroeconomic data did 
not vary throughout the period considered (see Table 1, 
Panel A).
The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 was 
that the first includes only the control variables and 
OLM, while in the second the other main variables are 
added, all indicating some type of risk. The goodness of 
fit (measured by R2) and the statistical significance of the 
results increased only slightly when introducing these 
variables, which indicated that operating leverage is the 
main determinant of the cost of debt. It was observed 
that the different risk factors did not affect the cost in 
the same way in all the countries studied. For example, 
the result from Poland stands out (Table 5, Model 2), 
since OLM was the only statistically significant varia-
ble. It was also noteworthy that the goodness of fit and 
the significance of the analyses was greatest for British 
companies.
Model 3, by introducing the cross-effects of OLM with 
the main variables, allowed us to know the relationship 
that operating leverage had with the other sources of risk 
and to explain to what extent the hypotheses proposed in 
this work were supported. It is the model that offers the 
highest R2 and with the lowest measurement error for all 
countries. Likewise, we ascertained (through Wald's con-
trast) that, in general, the variables jointly and actively 
contributed to explaining the cost of debt. 
Although the agri-food sector is characterised by ha-
ving little demand elasticity, it is a very competitive sec-
tor. This leads us to predict that operating leverage can 
affect the cost of debt to a greater extent than in other 
industries.
We observed a positive effect between the level of in-
debtedness (LEV) and the cost of debt in the complete 
sample (Table 4, Model 3) and the variable crossed with 
OLM of the opposite sign. This result confirmed the ac-
ceptance of Hypothesis 1, that is, the higher the operating 
leverage, the lower the positive relationship between in-
debtedness (LEV) and the cost of debt. When analysing 
this variable by country, it is worth noting that the results 
in France were opposite and, on the other hand, in Poland 
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research September 2020 • Volume 18 • Issue 3 • e0109
11Operating leverage and the cost of debt in European agri-food firms
Table 4. Determinants of cost of debt in Europe
EUROPE
















































R2 adjusted 0.2251 0.2349 0.2645
Wald (δ1= ... =δ6=0) 34,564.12** 64,891.44** 66,841.62**
E( )=0 364.9684** 609.1847** 645.3674**
Estimation error 1.4157 1.2188 1.2036
m2 test 0.79 0.67 0.63
Sargan test 81.05(73) 85.42(79) 88.36(79)
p–Hausman 0.3458 0.3347 0.5214
The data in this table correspond to two-step regression results from the GMM model in first differences, described in the Eq. (2), where the 
dependent variable is the cost of debt (COD) of the European firms. The main variables are: OLM (Net Fixed Assets / Total Assets), LEV 
(Total Debts / Total Assets), LTOTASS (logarithm of the Total Assets), INTANG (Intangible Assets / Total Assets), AGE (number of active 
years), and GDPGRW (GDP increase). The cross effects correspond to the main variables multiplied by the operating leverage measure. The 
control variables are: INTCOV (EBIT/Interest expense), LIQUID (Current Assets-Stocks/Current Liabilities) and CASH (Cash Flow/Ope-
rating Income). t-Statistic in brackets. As measures of the goodness of fit, we propose the adjusted R2, the Wald test set of coefficients equal 
to each other and equal to zero (under the null hypothesis that δ1=δ2= ... =δ6=0, the estimation error calculated from the sum of the mean 
of the square of the errors (errors due to the bias of the estimator) plus the variance, and the significance of the total set of the mean of the 
error equal to zero on the residuals (under the null hypothesis that E( )=0). In addition, m2 is a test for second-order serial autocorrelation 
in residuals in first differences, distributed asymptotically as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Sargan Test is a 
test of over-identifying restrictions distributed asymptotically under the null hypothesis of validity of instruments as Chi-squared: degrees 
of freedom in brackets. p–Hausman is the p–value in Hausman’s (1978) test. In this case, the estimations for instrumental variables and OLS 
are compared. Acceptance of the null hypotheses implies no endogeneity problems.  **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.1.
12 Alfredo Grau and Araceli Reig
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research September 2020 • Volume 18 • Issue 3 • e0109
the level of indebtedness was not a determinant of the cost 
of debt (Table 5, Model 3).
The behaviour of the level of indebtedness was 
the opposite only in France. In a previous sec-
tion, we mentioned France’s support of innovation by 
13  See the report on the financing of innovation in France: https://santandertrade.com/en/portal
subsidising innovative companies through cheaper 
financing.13  
The ratio between the size of the asset (LTOTASS) 
and the cost of debt was negative in the whole European 
sample, but this effect was lower if the operating leverage 
Table 5. Determinants of the cost of debt by country
France Italy Poland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Main variables
c 0.0065** 0.0066** 0.0190** 0.0143** 0.0197** 0.0243** 0.0124** 0.0116 0.0273*
(13.1107) (4.8314) (14.2512) (36.6627) (14.7265) (19.2377) (2.5742) (0.8383) (2.2537)
OLM 0.0197** 0.0297** 0.0169** 0.0176** 0.0264** 0.0262**
(24.1696) (25.3192) (20.3289) (19.7224) (3.1927) (3.0463)
LEV -4.25E-05 -0.0055** 0.0051** 0.0124** 0.0020 -0.0053
(-0.0464) (-3.5089) (4.8463) (7.9557) (0.2005) (-0.3038)
LTOTASS -0.0004^ -0.0032** -0.0028** -0.0055** 0.0002 -0.0035
(-1.7379) (-8.6713) (-10.6832) (-15.0816) (0.0766) (-1.0194)
INTANG -0.0146** -0.0147** 0.0173** 0.0614** 0.0221 0.1759
(-12.8276) (-3.7778) (6.8279) (7.5390) (0.6360) (0.5484)
AGE -1.43E-05 3.09E-05 -1.97E-05* -5.35E-05** -5.54E-05 5.83E-05
(-1.4823) (1.4928) (-1.9074) (-2.7562) (-1.0602) 0.423758
Cross effects
   
LEV*OLM 0.0121** -0.0187** 0.0122
(4.5599) (-6.4266) (0.4221)
LTOTASS*OLM 0.0069** 0.0079** 0.0066
(10.1463) (11.5968) (1.2831)
INTANG*OLM 0.0046 -0.0725** -0.2349
(0.9788) (-5.3366) (-0.4819)
AGE*OLM -0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0002
(-2.5863) (2.4071) (-0.8884)
Control variables
INTCOV -9.44E-07** -9.24E-07** -9.47E-07** -8.95E-07** -8.57E-07** -8.28E-07** -1.24E-05 -1.25E-05 -1.25E-04
(-5.7959) (-5.6762) (-5.8117) (-9.1999) (-8.8208) (-8.5077) (-1.4906) (-1.4414) -1.438988
LIQUID 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0004 0.0010** 0.0013** 0.0014** -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0018
(3.3434) (2.7728) (1.5516) (6.7619) (7.1490) (7.4714) (-0.8033) (-0.5357) (-0.7336)
CASH 0.0001^ 2.98E-05 4.36E-05 -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(1.7916) (0.6494) (0.9445) (-6.3253) (-5.7388) (-5.2964) (-1.0592) (-0.9533) (-0.9161)
R2 adjusted 0.2549 0.2493 0.2864 0.2496 0.2599 0.2732 0.2503 0.2593 0.2766
Wald (δ1= ... =δ6=0) 12,574.66** 12,612.36** 11,512.61** 34,564.12** 64,891.44** 66,841.62** 4,564.12* 4,891.44* 5,841.62*
E( )=0 147.3264** 204.6974** 198.6451** 452.6647** 561.3674** 463.6647** 34.0368* 36.6457* 31.6974*
Estimation error 1.1641 1.1552 0.9644 2.3641 1.6587 1.6077 2.6974 1.8744 1.0587
m2 test 0.97 0.8 0.65 0.85 0.7 0.68 0.96 0.91 0.90
Sargan test 63.37(68) 79.29(72) 90.31(72) 77.18(49) 91.29(49) 92.91(50) 61.25(50) 66.75(50) 67.88(51)
p–Hausman 0.4574 0.4522 0.4867 0.7557 0.7474 0.7928 0.1547 0.1674 0.1698
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was greater, since the sign was the opposite when the two 
variables were crossed, which supports Hypothesis 2. The 
same result was obtained in all countries except Poland, 
where, as we already indicated, only OLM was statisti-
cally significant.
The relationship between the specificity and innova-
tion variable (INTANG) and the cost of debt was negative 
in the whole European sample (Table 4, Models 2 and 3). 
The results obtained with this variable we are very diffe-
rent in the analysis by country (see Table 5). This is owing 
to the fact that incentive policies were very different in 
each country and the results obtained with this variable 
were very different in the analysis by country. In Spain 
and Italy, the increase in specificity increased the cost, 
although this relationship decreased if the operating le-
verage increased. However, in France, whose companies 
Table 5. Continued
Spain Sweden United Kingdom
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Main variables
c 0.0193** 0.0219** 0.0234** 0.0251** 0.0583** 0.0675** 0.0028^ -0.0220** -0.0063
(81.7823) (37.5696) (43.0611) (14.5386) (13.2946) (17.0999) (1.6829) (-5.0353) (-1.5838)
OLM 0.0036** 0.0036** 0.0226** 0.0202** 0.0337** 0.0318**
(8.2249) (7.9961) (7.3203) (6.5549) (11.3648) (10.4044)
LEV -0.0014** 0.0050** -0.0129** 0.0029 0.0131** 0.0258**
(-4.1589) (8.2354) (-4.1891) (0.6851) (5.3931) (5.3311)
LTOTASS -0.0004** -0.0025** -0.0073** -0.0148** 0.0026** -0.0022^
(-3.0729) (-11.2296) (-9.9421) (-11.6328) (3.0314) (-1.8696)
INTANG 0.0052* 0.0214* 0.0285** 0.0152 0.0014 -0.0355
(2.0003) (2.0907) (3.0103) (0.2667) (0.2064) (-1.2138)
AGE -1.05E-05 1.14E-05 -5.40E-06 5.41E-05 0.0001** 9.67E-05*
-1.266727 (0.6144) (-0.1830) 0.710701 (7.0148) (2.0721)
Cross effects
   
LEV*OLM -0.0128** -0.0354** -0.0299**
(-12.6689) (-4.9867) (-3.0969)
LTOTASS*OLM 0.0043** 0.0166** 0.0102**
(12.0440) (7.12563) (5.8320)
INTANG*OLM -0.0266^ 0.0162 0.0568
(-1.8401) (0.2160) (1.2061)
AGE*OLM -3.03E-05 -0.0002 4.83E-05
(-0.8758) (-0.9633) (0.5705)
Control variables     
INTCOV -3.26E-07** -3.24E-07** -3.03E-07** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -8.36E-06** -7.64E-06** -7.47E-06**
(-3.8960) (-3.8717) (-3.6261) (-6.5153) (-5.9546) (-5.3957) (5.0938) (-4.6971) (-4.6033)
LIQUID 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0026** -9.40E-05** 6.61E-05 0.0031** 0.0046** 0.0049**
-10.1356 (8.0082) (9.8517) (3.2395) (-0.0986) (0.0388) (4.3689) (5.9212) (6.2314)
CASH -8.86E-05** -9.76E-05** -0.0001** -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 6.79E-05 5.42E-05
(-6.2573) (-6.4979) (-6.7436) (-2.2009) (-1.3457) (-1.4402) (1.0701) (0.4707) (0.3778)
R2 adjusted 0.2065 0.2102 0.2466 0.2344 0.2903 0.3312 0.2849 0.3009 0.3521
Wald (δ1= ... =δ6=0) 28,641.33** 31,546.69** 30,264.48** 11,564.55** 15,687.54** 16,764.22** 896.31** 1,012.54** 1,066.88**
E( )=0 649.784** 596.3147** 555.3672** 108.6314** 99.6415** 113.1547** 235.6533** 315.6314** 208.6541**
Estimation error 1.6651 1.5367 1.5057 9.6451 9.2974 7.1103 1.3387 1.3315 1.3174
m2 test 0.90 0.82 0.79 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.98 0.95 0.94
Sargan test 73.54(68) 79.72(72) 81.02(72) 59.62(49) 60.74(49) 61.88(50) 58.19(47) 66.74(58) 70.41(67)
p–Hausman 0.4867 0.4154 0.5007 0.6674 0.5977 0.6661 0.5874 0.5687 0.5964
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obtained the largest subsidies and made the greatest in-
vestment in R&D (FIAB, 2016)14, the relationship be-
tween specificity and cost of debt was negative, such that 
the companies with the highest specific investments were 
those that bear less cost. On the other hand, in the UK 
there was no relationship between these variables. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was supported in Spain and Italy, but not in 
France. On the other hand, in the UK there was no rela-
tionship between these variables.
The Age (AGE) had a negative effect on the cost of 
debt in the European sample, so that, as expected, youn-
ger firms bear higher costs when financing their produc-
tive activity with debt. However, the cross effect was of 
the opposite sign (Table 4, Model 3). Consequently, we 
can affirm, as stated in Hypothesis 4, that the greater the 
operating leverage, the lower the negative relationship be-
tween age and the cost of debt. In the analyses of Model 3 
by country (Table 5), Hypothesis 4 was only supported in 
Italy. In the majority of the countries, age was not statis-
tically significant, which can be explained because within 
each country age is a fairly homogeneous variable and it 
ceases to be determinative.
In general, the results obtained allow us to affirm that 
the explanatory capacity of the proposed variables was 
much greater for the British firms, demonstrating that 
those British firms that assume more risks are the most 
penalised with the requirement of a higher risk premium. 
Indeed, the goodness of fit and significance of the analy-
ses was greatest for British companies. In contrast, in 
countries that share the fact of being governed by civil 
law and being more oriented towards banking, the effect 
of risk on the cost of debt was less significant, as in the 
case of Spain and Italy. 
Poland’s result also stands out since the operating leve-
rage was the only statistically significant variable. Poland 
was the country that experienced the highest growth in 
the period under consideration, including the crisis years, 
and many Polish agri-food companies made many invest-
ments in fixed assets, increasing their operating leverage. 
Indeed, agri-food firms in general had, on average, greater 
operating leverage than other European firms and lower 
levels of indebtedness. Therefore, the higher operational 
risk has been offset by lower financial risk. 
Discussion 
Given the importance of the agri-food industry in the 
European economy and the major drive for innovation 
made by its companies and governments, it has been 
worthwhile to analyse whether the sector has an adequate 
14 See the full report of FIAB (Spanish Federation of Food and Beverage Industries) of 2015 at: http://fiab.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Informe-Económico-2015.
pdf 
operating cost structure, and whether this structure affects 
the financial cost, given that this directly affects the com-
petitiveness of companies. However, those studies that 
analyse operating leverage have examined its effect on 
operating profitability, a variable that does not consider 
debt (e.g. Grau & Reig, 2020).
The results of this research clearly show the impor-
tance of operating leverage as a determinant of the cost 
of debt, tallying with other authors who have addres-
sed the relationship between these variables (O'Brien & 
Vanderheiden, 1987; Houmes et al., 2012; Cao, 2015; 
Harjoto, 2017). 
To obtain this result, it has been crucial to consider only 
one sector of activity, the agri-food sector. By not mixing 
companies from different sectors in the same study, our 
results offer much clearer evidence, given that operational 
risk is highly determinant of risk if we are within the same 
industry (Novy-Marx, 2011). In this paper, clear evidence 
is provided, unlike other studies that mix several sectors 
(e.g. Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2007; Van Binsbergen et al., 
2010) without reaching such conclusive results. 
Furthermore, the results of this work demonstrate the 
importance that the legal and institutional environment 
has in determining the cost of debt. As indicated in the 
text, countries that are governed by "common law" and 
have a market-oriented economy, generate more infor-
mation and have systems that protect investors more, 
hence companies are less likely to take risks. These argu-
ments are corroborated by the empirical findings of other 
research (La Porta et al., 1997; Cleassens et al., 2000), 
which shows that the legal, economic and institutional 
characteristics of a country affect the risk that companies 
are willing to assume and, therefore, the cost of debt. 
When studying the effect that operating leverage has 
on other risk factors, the result obtained with the level of 
indebtedness is interesting: the higher the operating le-
verage, the lower the positive effect that indebtedness or 
financial leverage has on the cost of debt. The explana-
tion for this result is that companies offset both economic 
and financial risks. The extreme case is found in Poland, 
where the level of debt is not a determinant of the cost. 
The results are in line with those obtained in other stu-
dies in which it is concluded that operating leverage can 
determine the firm's risk to a greater extent, decreasing 
and even nullifying the effect of financial risk (Houmes 
et al., 2012). 
In general, the effect of operating leverage on indeb-
ted European agribusinesses allows them to reduce their 
financial burdens, agreeing with the results of Kahl et al. 
(2014) and Harjoto (2017). As indicated by these authors, 
companies with higher fixed costs follow a more conser-
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vative financial policy by having lower debt rates. Our 
study has shown that both types of leverage (financial and 
operating) can be offset by agribusinesses to reduce ove-
rall risk and financing costs. 
This risk compensation is also supported by the fact 
that "common law" countries are less risk-averse, and if 
they have a higher weight of intangible assets, making 
them riskier, they will offset this with less debt.
It is also worth highlighting the result obtained with 
the size and age variables. This industry is characterised 
by being very competitive with many small and young 
companies competing with larger and more mature firms. 
We have included in this study both SMEs and large agri-
food companies, unlike those papers which only analy-
se quoted companies (García-Feijóo & Jorgensen, 2010; 
Houmes et al., 2012; Cao, 2015) or only include SMEs 
(Grau & Reig, 2020). Size, measured by the volume of 
assets of the firm, was decisive in all the analyses carried 
out, indicating that small firms are riskier and they are 
required to pay more interest on their debts, although this 
effect is mitigated if the firms do not have a very levera-
ged cost structure. In the same way, and as expected, age 
had a negative effect on the cost of debt. Thus, younger 
companies bear a higher cost when financing their pro-
ductive activity with debt. 
The agri-food sector, being a key sector in the Euro-
pean economy, has been subject to special aid programs 
distributed in volume unevenly across countries. If we 
add to this the national subsidy programs, the level of in-
debtedness is not a clear determinant of the cost of debt in 
European agri-food firms, since some subsidised compa-
nies become more indebted with cheaper loans. 
The results obtained in this research have important 
implications for the managers of companies and for those 
responsible for agri-food industrial policy, both in Europe 
and at the local level of each country. Not mixing firms 
from different sectors allows conclusions to be drawn that 
can help stakeholders in the sector and policymakers to 
make decisions that improve the results of these firms and, 
therefore, boost the economic growth of the countries.
We believe that our research could be expanded by 
incorporating a greater number of countries into the mix 
and grouping them according to the origins of their legal 
systems and by whether they are oriented towards ban-
king or the market. In this way, we can compare the cost 
strategies that companies follow and their effects, depen-
ding on the institutional and legal environment.
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